Comment on Rosenfeld and Kleykamp, ASR, December 2009
After decades of de-unionization, research suggests that Hispanics-and Hispanic immigrants in particular-may revitalize organized labor in the United States. Most of this research consists of case studies of individual organizing campaigns (see, e.g., Milkman 2006) . In 2009, however, Rosenfeld and Kleykamp (hereafter RK) set out to determine whether these campaigns had produced quantifiable gains at the national level. By analyzing detailed data from the Current Population Survey (CPS), they found that when compared to native-born whites "many Hispanic subgroups are no less likely," and some Hispanic subgroups are "more likely," to join or belong to labor unions (Rosenfeld and Kleykamp 2009:933) . These results are important, for they buttress the hopes of both Hispanic workers, who view union membership as a potential avenue to upward mobility, and union organizers, who view immigrants as a potential source of new members. RK note that overall union density is low in the United States, and that unionization is therefore unlikely to usher in widespread assimilation absent a "fundamental restructuring of the institutional underpinnings of organized labor" (p. 933), but they find that Hispanic immigrants "organize at higher rates than do U.S. born whites" (p. 932) and interpret their findings as evidence for the "steady" assimilation of Hispanics who find themselves in "organizable labor market positions" (p. 933).
But the CPS did not begin to identify immigrants until 1994. RK conducted their analyses in the years prior to the Great Recession of 2007 to 2009. The bulk of their data are therefore drawn from a decidedly prosperous period in U.S. history. Will the immigrant influx survive the recent downturn? While RK "indirectly control" (p. 919) for effects of the business cycle by deploying state and year fixed effects, they neither test-nor claim to test-effects of the macroeconomy more generally. Their conclusions are therefore vulnerable to charges of ahistoricism that bedevil analysts who try to control-rather than theorize-effects of time (Isaac and Griffin 1989) .
I therefore address the effects of the recent downturn head-on by extending the models developed by RK through the Great Recession of 2008 and beyond. Results suggest that Hispanic immigrants, who held higher odds of union entry or membership in RK's prerecession analysis, lost union jobs more rapidly than did native non-Hispanic whites during the downturn regardless of citizenship and years since entry. In all likelihood, these results are not attributable to the unfavorable labor market allocation of immigrants, as will be discussed below, and to some degree undercut the hopes of both those who view immigrants as the key to organized labor's future and those who view unionization as the key to immigrant prosperity. 
DAtA AnD MethoDs
Data come from the CPS-March outgoing rotation groups and Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups (MORG) for various years.
2 I recoded labor market position and firm size variables to match RK's do files, and data are limited to non-self-employed wage and salary workers age 18 to 65 years. A second analysis takes advantage of the longitudinal aspect of the CPS. Using the same matching scheme for the MORG provided by RK, I report the odds that members of immigrant racial/ethnic groups will leave a union from one year to the next. The matching process creates two-year panel data from which changes in union status can be calculated. I performed a multinomial logistic regression with four unordered categorical outcomes (i.e., joining a union, leaving a union, staying in a union, and never being in a union). 6 In 2007, Hispanics were neither more nor less likely to hold a union job than were non-Hispanic whites, following RK, in both the market position and firm size models. In 2009, however, while failing to reach conventional significance levels, Hispanics had 22.4 percent lower odds of holding union jobs than did their nonHispanic white counterparts in the market position model. Once firm size is included, Hispanics and non-Hispanic whites continue to show no statistically discernible differences in . According to the Census Bureau, individuals who remain in the public administration industry "oversee governmental programs and activities that are not performed by private establishments" (http://www.census.gov/naics). The Census Bureau further specifies, "government establishments engaged in the production of privatesector-like goods and services should be classified in the same industry as private-sector establishments engaged in similar activities" (http://www.census.gov/naics). Therefore, all individuals in the public administration industry remain in the public sector, but those in other industries may be in either the private or public sector. As a robustness check, first, I ran all models without the private sector dummy. I found substantively similar results for the race/ethnic groups, but the model fit is greatly reduced. A second robustness check collapsed the industry variables into major industry codes defined by Waldinger and Der-Martirosian (2000) . One dummy includes all public sector/public administration workers and five other private industry sectors. Again, I found substantively similar results for the race/ ethnic categories, however, the other race category flirts with different levels of significance. F.I.R.E. refers to financial, insurance, and real estate industries. * p < .05 (two-tailed tests). Given that these effects do not filter through all immigrant race/ethnic categories, they suggest that mechanisms that predict a lower propensity for Hispanic immigrants to organize are in place, whatever those mechanisms may be.
ResUlts

Modeling Union Membership through the Recession
The second set of models in Table 2 includes years since entry for Hispanic immigrants. RK found that, controlling for relevant variables, Hispanic immigrants who had lived in the United States for more than 20 years were no more likely to hold union jobs than were native-born whites. But they also noted that immigrant organizing is a relatively recent phenomenon and their data may therefore have averaged out its effects. This interpretation finds some support in my analyses, which show that Hispanic immigrants with more than 20 years in the United States had over 70 percent higher odds of unionization than did native non-Hispanic whites in 2007. But the two groups betrayed no statistically discernible differences in 2009, when the odds ratio for experienced Hispanics actually fell below 1. Moreover, recent Hispanic immigrants had lower odds of unionization than did non-Hispanic whites in both 2007 and 2009. Finally, the gap between newcomers and non-Hispanic whites was larger at the bottom of the recession.
The third set of models in Table 2 addresses the subcategory of Hispanic immigrant citizenship status. Hispanic immigrant citizens had over 60 percent higher odds of unionization than did their native white counterparts in 2007. This effect is different from that found by RK, who show that, controlling for firm size, these citizens had 20 percent higher odds of unionization than did non-Hispanic whites. I found that in 2007, Hispanic immigrant noncitizens revealed no difference in the odds of holding a union job when compared to native-born whites. This also differs from RK's results, which show that Hispanic immigrant noncitizens had 40 percent lower odds of holding a union job, all else being equal. As in previous models, differences between my 2007 cross-section and RK's analysis may be due to their larger sample, because their data are spread over several years that may average out the statistical effect of one year. Differences between 2007 and 2009 show similar patterns: the statistically significant advantage Hispanic immigrant citizens enjoyed in 2007 fell to nonsignificance in 2009; and Hispanic immigrant noncitizens had over 50 percent lower odds of unionization than did native nonHispanic whites (from no statistically discernible effect in 2007). Hispanic immigrants who became citizens, and in so doing underwent some form of assimilation, were still disadvantaged in holding onto union jobs.
The last set of models in Table 2 includes Hispanic nationality and immigrant subcategories. Unionists or employers may view immigrants differently depending on their country of origin. Furthermore, differential socialization at the point of origin may influence the propensity to unionize in the United States. In RK's analysis, Mexican immigrants and non-Mexican Hispanic immigrants had lower odds of unionization than did native non-Hispanic whites. Although my 2007 analysis reveals no significant difference in their propensity to organize, by 2009 Mexican and non-Mexican Hispanic immigrants had lower odds of union membership than did native-born whites net of other factors. Furthermore, the gap between these two groups and non-Hispanic whites in 2009 was greater than that found in RK's pre-recession analysis. By contrast, Hispanic-origin and Mexican-origin natives showed no difference in union membership compared to native non-Hispanic whites in both years. Table 3 reports interactions for year and immigrant subcategories pooling 2007, 2008, and 2009 . For the results discussed earlier, the 2009 interaction coefficients show that observed differences are correctly signed in all-and statistically significant in mostcases. These results suggest mechanisms are in play that pushed Hispanic immigrants to leave union jobs at higher rates than did native non-Hispanic whites and native-born Hispanics during the Great Recession. However, it is important to understand whether these effects are specific to the Great Recession, or whether Hispanic immigrants' deunionization is a function of broader economic circumstances over time. I therefore leverage the full dataset for which immigrant status is available (1994 to 2011).
7 I present the interaction of the co-racial/ethnic unemployment rate for respondents age 18 to 65 years and the immigrant subcategories. 8 Because unions emphasize economic gains for their members, there may be a disemployment effect where higher wages force employers to lower the number of employees in a firm. Workers, then, may become unemployed until they find employment in the nonunion sector. To prevent this potential reverse causality, I lag the unemployment rate by one year (e.g., last year's co-racial/ethnic unemployment rate predicts this year's co-racial/ethnic unionization odds). Table 4 presents interactions for 1994 to 2007 ( just before the Great Recession) and then adds the recession years.
In the years prior to the Great Recession, Table 4 shows no interaction effect unique to immigrants vis-à-vis native non-Hispanic whites. We might find effects between unemployment and Hispanic immigrants if we could examine years prior to 1994 (when the CPS began to track immigrant status), because unemployment did not increase sharply in the years leading up to the Great Recession. 9 However, with inclusion of the Great Recession years, 2008 to 2011, unemployment produces lower odds of unionization for Hispanic immigrants compared with native nonHispanic whites. The interaction effect filters through Hispanic immigrant noncitizens and Hispanic-and Mexican-origin immigrants. Interestingly, the years since entry model suggests that only immigrants who have remained in the United States for a long time and recent arrivals have lower unionization odds as unemployment increases (although recent arrivals fail to reach a conventional significance level in the firm size model). Recessions might have a nonlinear interaction with time since arrival, where low and long tenure predicts de-unionization as unemployment increases. Low tenure immigrants may have been subject to last hired, first fired dynamics, and long tenured immigrants may have voluntarily taken early retirement in the downturn or involuntarily lost their union jobs and found it difficult to retrain. Nevertheless, these mechanisms are purely speculative and should be examined in future research.
Hispanic immigrants who became citizens, however, show no statistically discernible difference from native non-Hispanic whites, which may support the notion of assimilation into the economic mainstream. Inclusion of the Great Recession years supports the earlier analysis and suggests that Hispanic immigrants are more likely to lose union jobs (voluntarily or involuntarily) at an increased rate as unemployment rates skyrocket. These effects may be due to the recession affecting unionized sectors more than nonunionized sectors, unfavorable labor market allocation, seniority schemes, or a host of other mechanisms. The following analysis sheds light on potential reasons for the decrease in odds of unionization for immigrants.
Modeling the Odds of Leaving a Union
The CPS-Matched MORG dataset allows one to estimate the shift from employment to unemployment during the recession and the odds of leaving a union in a one-year period. First, as noted earlier, the recession may have affected unionized sectors more than nonunionized sectors. Immigrants tend to concentrate in the construction industry and low-wage occupations-industries that were especially hard-hit during the recession. If these industries became less union dense as the recession unfolded, this would have a major impact on the likelihood that an immigrant would hold on to a union job. A model determining the shift from employment to unemployment shows that, controlling for industry and other labor market position variables, the odds of entry into unemployment in a one-year period were significantly lower for union members than for nonunionized workers as the recession unfolded. 10 Unionized workers were thus less rather than more likely to lose their jobs.
Second, by focusing on union leavers, as opposed to union joiners, we can better understand why effects described earlier may have occurred and simultaneously shed light on whether the changing industrial composition of the U.S. workforce may be to blame for the decline in unionization of Hispanic immigrants (and Hispanic immigrant subcategories).
11 Table 4 presents odds of leaving a union (as opposed to staying in a union) for race/ethnic categories and Hispanic immigrant subcategories. The model showing race/ ethnic immigrant and nonimmigrant categories also reports selected industries to show whether working in these industries significantly predicts union leaving.
The first three columns of Table 5 control for the labor market position variables defined by RK. The next three columns add a dummy variable for change in occupation and a dummy variable for the change in industry to the market position variables. The last three columns limit the sample to only respondents who remained in a stable occupation and industry. Odds that both immigrants and nonimmigrant minorities leave a union (as opposed to staying in a union) increase compared to native non-Hispanic whites between the pre-recession and recession/post-recession years.
12 These trends continue when change in occupation and industry dummies are included. The CPS does not allow analysis for individuals who remained employed with the same employer. However, respondents who stayed in the same occupation and industry (with the exception of the other race categories) also showed increased odds of leaving a union compared to their white counterparts. The gap between minority immigrant groups and native non-Hispanic whites widened in the intermediary period, with few exceptions. In all likelihood, this was a result of minorities' vulnerability to economic downturns. Hout and colleagues (2011) suggest the recession affected minorities before the recession officially began in December 2007-especially for African Americans and immigrants-a finding consistent with the odds of losing a union job in my own analysis. For instance, Hispanic-origin natives were no more likely to lose a union job than were non-Hispanic whites in 2004 to 2006, but they had 55.4 percent higher odds of leaving a union than did non-Hispanic whites in the intermediary period. In the recession/ post-recession years, the gap was invariably significant and tended to widen. In a few cases it tightened a bit-perhaps because minorities had already lost their union status-but it never fails to achieve significance.
Logistic regressions from Table 2 suggest that Hispanic immigrants were most likely to lose union status. Hispanic immigrants were more likely to leave a union than were native non-Hispanic whites in all models in all periods. In fact, in the labor market position model, Hispanic immigrants had 79.9 percent higher odds of leaving a union (as opposed to staying in a union) between 2004 and 2006 and 94.2 percent higher odds of leaving a union between 2008 and 2010 than did their native non-Hispanic white counterparts. Table 5 controls for selected industries to determine whether elevated odds of leaving a union were due to the changing composition of U.S. industries. There were no significant differences in leaving a union (as opposed to staying in a union) between the shown industries and the baseline agriculture, forestry, and fishery industry in the three periods. The sign changed, however, in all but the stable occupation and industry models from lower (but not significant) odds of leaving to higher (but not significant) odds of leaving between the three periods. This suggests that holding a job in these industries did not significantly predict whether someone lost a union job, and the changing composition alone did not account for Hispanic immigrants' lower odds of holding a union job. Table 5 also reports the odds of leaving a union in a one-year period for Hispanic immigrant subcategories. Whereas seniority schemes may predict that recent Hispanic immigrants will become increasingly more likely to leave a union because unions have only recently targeted these groups, it is possible that immigrants who have remained in the United States for a long period should be no less likely to leave a union than would a native non-Hispanic white. Unfortunately, the CPS does not report how long an individual has remained on the job, so this analysis is impossible. But the odds that Hispanic immigrants left a union increased as the recession unfolded, regardless of how many years they had remained in the United States compared with their native non-Hispanic white counterparts. Logistic regressions show that Hispanic immigrants who had remained in the United States for more than 20 years were more likely to hold a union job in 2007 and neither less nor more likely to hold a union job in a statistical sense than were native whites in 2009. However, the gap between this group and native non-Hispanic whites in the odds of leaving a union increased from 52. We see the same results for Hispanic immigrants who became U.S. citizens. Hispanic immigrant citizens and noncitizens show increasing odds of leaving a union compared to native non-Hispanic whites following the patterns above. These effects continue to manifest in models that include a change in occupation and industry as well as the model limiting the sample to respondents who remained in the same occupation and industry. With the exception of Mexican-origin natives, the nationality models also show similar results. The race/ethnic immigrant and nonimmigrant models show increasing odds of leaving a union for Hispanic-origin natives compared to their native white counterparts as described earlier. 
ConClUsIons
Recessions are an unavoidable feature of market economies, and they will affect the life chances and opportunity structures available to different groups depending on how they are mediated by societal institutions and economic structures. My results suggest that, net of other factors, compared to nonHispanic whites, Hispanic immigrants were more likely to lose union jobs (whether voluntarily or involuntarily) at an increased rate during the Great Recession. This has potentially disruptive effects throughout the economy and society. After all, immigrants have breathed new life into unions, and unions have given working-class immigrants a potential ladder out of low-paying jobs. But unions that hope to organize immigrants must address cultural and language differences as well as possible racial prejudices from employers and the native working class. Recessions may make this task harder by altering the design of governmental policies, employers' attitudes, and the patience of local communities-and in so doing may steer immigrants away from the organizable sectors of the economy to ethnic and enclave economies that may be unorganizable. If the link between unions and immigrants is severed, both communities are likely to suffer.
The specific mechanisms that would lead to lower immigrant unionization in bad times should thus be examined-perhaps through case studies that ask not only "who joins" but also "who leaves unions." Such analyses would shed light not only on why immigrants were disproportionately likely to lose union jobs in the recession, but also on whether their rates of unionization will recover with the macroeconomy-or whether a lasting scarring effect will make immigrants more difficult to organize in the future.
RK conclude that many Hispanic immigrant subgroups have a higher propensity to unionize than do native-born workers and find evidence for the "steady" assimilation of Hispanics who find themselves in "organizable labor market positions" (p. 933). But immigrants' propensity to unionize is by no means unchanging, and Hispanic assimilation need not be steady over time. RK identified very real gains among immigrants in the period prior to the Great Recession, but my analysis suggests these gains have to a large degree evaporated in the wake of the recent downturn. To fully understand the immigrantunion relationship, and to avoid the perils of ahistoricism, we need to examine data collected in bad times as well as good times at a relatively fine level of detail. Figure 2 shows potential recession effects for Hispanics in most recession periods (the interesting exception being the 1981 to 1982 recession, which until recently was the most severe postwar recession). 2. All CPS datasets were downloaded from the National Bureau of Economic Research (http:// www.nber.org/cps). My own files used to recode and merge the NBER data are available upon request in addition to all supplementary analyses. 3. By keeping the positive selection of only respondents who remain employed, I implicitly controlled for those who were more likely to lose a job during the recession. 4. The logistic regressions control for the labor market and firm size variables defined by RK (for a list of covariates used, see Rosenfeld and Kleykamp [2009] Table A1 in the Appendix for results. 11. I do not report the odds of joining a union because the economic downturn reduced the number of people who report this status. However, the odds of joining a union (as opposed to never being in a union) increased or remained similar over the three periods for many of the race/ethnicity categories compared to native whites. Whereas these groups' preference for union jobs may have increased, union joiners are not able to replace union leavers during the recession. 12. The exception being the nonimmigrant other race category, which largely consists of Asian Americans.
APPenDIx
